

Message Text

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E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, NATO, MNUC

SUBJ: INITIAL COMMENT ON PRELIMINARY PHASE II REPORT

REF: NPG/WP(74)9, DATED 4 DECEMBER 1974

MISSION PROVIDES BELOW TEXT OF LETTER TO ACTING SYG PANSA FROM
AMBASSADOR MENZIES (CANADA) CONCERNING CANADIAN COMMENTS ON
PRELIMINARY PHASE II REPORT, AND TEXT OF CANADIAN COMMENTS:

BEGIN TEXT OF LETTER:

ATTACHED ARE THE VIEWS OF MY AUTHORITIES ON THE
PRELIMINARY REPORT ON PHASE II OF THE FOLLOW-ON USE PRO-
GRAMME, NPG/WP(74)9. IN COMMENTING ON THE REPORT, WHICH
THEY FIND TO BE A CREDITABLE WORK, MY AUTHORITIES HAVE
NATURALLY REFRAINED FROM REMARKING ON THE ARRANGEMENTS
FOR THE INITIATION OF PHASE III OF THE PROGRAMME AND ON
THE POSSIBLE RELATIONSHIP TO OTHER AREAS OF CURRENT NPG
INTEREST ON THE BASIS THESE CONSIDERATIONS WILL NO DOUBT
BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT BY PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES IN
THE PREPARATION OF THEIR OWN REPORT ON THIS SUBJECT WHICH
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IS TO BE FORWARDED TO MINISTERS FOR CONCURRENT CONSIDERA-
TION.

I AM SENDING A COPY OF THIS LETTER TO OUR

COLLEAGUES IN THE NPG.
END TEXT OF LETTER.

BEGIN TEXT OF COMMENTS:

WE FIND THE REPORT TO BE A GENERALLY WELL CON-
STRUCTED STUDY AND THE DISCUSSION OF FOLLOW-ON USE WITHIN
THE CONTEXT OF AGREED NATO STRATEGY TO BE WELL REASONED.
THE COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF PHASE I STUDIES AND THE CON-
CLUSIONS TO BE DRAWN THEREFROM IS A GOOD PIECE OF WORK.
ATTENTION IS RIGHTLY DRAWN TO THE LIMITATIONS OF EARLIER
STUDIES, TWO OF WHICH IN OUR VIEW--THAT PHASE I STUDIES
FOCUSSED ON MILITARY ASPECTS WITH LITTLE SERIOUS DISCUSSION
OF POLITICAL/MILITARY INTERACTION, AND THAT ALL STUDIES
MADE THE ASSUMPTION IN THE OPENING SCENARIO THAT NATO WAS
AT A SERIOUS MILITARY DISADVANTAGE--ARE OF PARTICULAR
IMPORTANCE IN SUBSEQUENT DISCUSSION. WE ALSO FIND THE
DISCUSSION ON DETERRENCE AND THE NATURE OF POSSIBLE ENEMY
RESPONSE TO BE GENERALLY WELL HANDLED.

APART FROM THE SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS, WE FIND
THAT THE MOST INTERESTING PART OF THE REPORT IS CONCERNED
WITH THE DISCUSSION OF WIDER POLITICAL AND MILITARY ASPECTS
OF FOLLOW-ON USE. ALTHOUGH THE REPORT GENERALLY STEERS
AN ACCEPTABLE MIDDLE COURSE BETWEEN WHAT MIGHT BE TERMED
THE TWO MAIN CONSIDERATIONS AT ISSUE, WE WONDER WHETHER
THE OPENING SENTENCE IN PARAGRAPH 65 COULD BE READ AS
IMPLYING THAT MILITARY UTILITY MIGHT IN SOME CIRCUMSTANCES
BE OF OVERRIDING IMPORTANCE IN FOLLOW-ON USE. IF SO, WE
WOULD SUGGEST THAT SUCH A FINDING IS NOT WARRANTED BY THE
STUDY.

WITH REGARD TO THE ASSERTION CONTAINED IN THE
SECOND SENTENCE OF PARAGRAPH 42 TO THE EFFECT ALL FORMS
OF FOLLOW-ON USE ARE SIMILAR AND THAT THE CONCLUSIONS
REACHED BY THE STUDY TEAM THEREFORE HAVE A GENERAL VALIDITY,
WE WONDER WHETHER THIS IS THE CASE. AS IS POINTED OUT
ELSEWHERE IN THE REPORT THE STUDY TEAM EFFORT WAS CIRCUM-
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SCRIBED BY THE FACT THAT WITH ONE EXCEPTION, ALL PHASE I
STUDIES PRESUPPOSED A MARKED CONVENTIONAL IMBALANCE IN
WARSAW PACT FAVOUR, ESPECIALLY IN THE CASE OF THEATRE
RESERVE FORCES, AND THAT THE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN A
SITUATION WHERE CONVENTIONAL FORCES WERE MORE NEARLY IN
BALANCE WAS NOT CONSIDERED IN ANY DETAIL. WHILE WE HAVE
NO PARTICULAR DIFFICULTY WITH THE STATEMENT WHEN READ IN
CONTEXT, WE ARE OF THE VIEW IT MAY APPEAR OVERLY CATEGORICALY
WHEN READ ALONE AND SUGGEST IT COULD PERHAPS BE REPHRASED
TO ADVANTAGE.

WE WOULD ALSO QUESTION THE STATEMENT IN THE SECOND
PART OF PARAGRAPH 73(F) WHICH IMPLIES THAT THE WARSAW PACT

IN THEIR RESPONSE MIGHT BE CAPABLE OF MATCHING NATO'S LOW YIELD WEAPONS. WE RECALL THAT THIS POINT CAME UP AS WELL IN THE WARSAW PACT STRATEGY STUDY AT WHICH TIME IT WAS AGREED THAT WHILE COMMAND AND CONTROL ARRANGEMENTS ON THE WARSAW PACT SIDE APPEARED ADEQUATE TO ENSURE CONTROL OF THE MANNER IN WHICH THEIR WEAPONS MIGHT BE EMPLOYED, THE QUESTION OF THE LEVEL OF THE RESPONSE WAS BEST LEFT OPEN.

TURNING TO THE CONCLUSIONS, WE NOTE THAT NO ATTEMPT SEEMS TO HAVE BEEN MADE IN PARAGRAPH 79 TO ADDRESS THE QUESTIONS PUT AT THE OUTSET IN PARAGRAPH 4. WHILE WE HAVE NO PARTICULAR DIFFICULTY WITH THE THREE MAIN CONCLUSIONS REACHED, WE ARE, NEVERTHELESS, CURIOUS AT THE TOTAL LACK OF REFERENCE IN THE FINDINGS TO THE OBJECTIVES PREVIOUSLY SET OUT, ESPECIALLY THAT CONTAINED IN PARAGRAPH 4(B) ON THE ENSURING OF POLITICAL CONTROL OF THE NUCLEAR ENGAGEMENT IN FOLLOW-ON USE. WHILE WE RECOGNIZE THAT THE QUESTIONS MAY NOT BE READILY ANSWERABLE IN THE TERMS PUT, OR PERHAPS IT WOULD BE PREFERABLE TO SAY THAT TO THE EXTENT THEY ARE ANSWERABLE THE FINDINGS SHOULD MORE PROPERLY BE REACHED DURING THE FORMULATION OF GUIDELINES IN PHASE III RATHER THAN IN PHASE II, WE BELIEVE THAT AN ATTEMPT BY THE STUDY TEAM TO CLARIFY THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN OBJECTIVES AND FINDINGS WOULD BE USEFUL.

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IN REWORKING THE CONCLUSIONS, THE STUDY GROUP MAY ALSO SEE MERIT IN MAKING THE POINT MORE EXPLICITLY THAN IS NOW THE CASE (PERHAPS IN PARAGRAPH 79(C)) THAT THE STRENGTHENING OF CONVENTIONAL FORCES WOULD AT THE SAME TIME SERVE TO ENHANCE THE DETERRENT VALUE OF THEATRE NUCLEAR WEAPONS. WE BELIEVE THE STUDY POINTS CLEARLY TO THE CONCLUSION THAT THE TACTICAL USE OF SUCH WEAPONS IN EUROPE COULD REQUIRE MORE RATHER THAN FEWER CONVENTIONAL FORCES AND THAT THE STRENGTHENING OF THE LATTER, WHILE ADDING TO THEIR OWN DETERRENT VALUE, WOULD AT THE SAME TIME SERVE TO ENHANCE THE DETERRENT VALUE OF THEATRE NUCLEAR WEAPONS.
END TEXT OF COMMENTS.BRUCE

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